WORLD, Page 33COLOMBIANoble Battle, Terrible TollIn his offensive against the coke princes, President Barco hasdented the drug pipeline but hardly destroyed it. The narcoslash back by terrorizing the innocentBy John Moody -- BOGOTA
The army major was flabbergasted at the offer, delivered by an
emissary of Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha: in return for destroying
confiscated documents and computer disks that provided a detailed
blueprint of Gacha's cocaine empire, the officer, whose monthly
salary is $300, would receive $1.2 million. Cash. If he refused,
the drug Mafia would hunt him down and slaughter him.
How many people would be strong enough to just say no? To
reject immediate wealth and accept a relentless shadow of violent
death? Yet the major did say no, and turned over the data to his
superiors. His bravery is only one unsung ballad of honor in
Colombia's crusade against its cocaine cowboys. It is also the
exception, not the rule.
President Virgilio Barco Vargas' four-month-old war against
his country's top narcos -- Gacha, Pablo Escobar Gaviria and the
three brothers of Medellin's Ochoa family -- has not gone as well
as he or the nation had hoped. Since Mob hit men assassinated
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in August and ignited
Barco's offensive, the leaders of Colombia's coke cartels have gone
into hiding, forfeiting posh estates and bank accounts; some
law-enforcement officials believe that the drug princes have even
undergone plastic surgery. Nevertheless, Gacha and company remain
immensely powerful, with their pipeline to the U.S. merely dented
and their profits still enormous. And in the past two weeks they
have demonstrated that they do not care how many people die in
their showdown with the government to see who really rules
Colombia.
Last week a half-ton of dynamite stashed in a stolen truck
exploded outside the headquarters of the DAS, the secret police in
overall charge of the coke battle. The blast, which gouged a
30-ft.-deep crater and damaged buildings as far as 40 blocks away,
killed at least 52 and injured 1,000. The day before the bombing,
a judge involved in prosecuting the drug masters was gunned down
while strolling the streets of Medellin. And nine days earlier, the
narcos planted a bomb that ripped apart an Avianca jetliner en
route from Bogota to Cali, claiming 107 lives. An anonymous caller
said the plane had been destroyed because its passengers included
five "snitches" -- people who, like the major, had defied the Mob
to help the government.
The early weeks of the offensive raised unrealistic
expectations that the drug empires could be quickly crushed. Jungle
labs were torched, properties and chemicals seized, and some 11,000
people detained. Today, with the war continuing but with fewer
spectacular results to show for its efforts, the Barco
administration is having a harder time making its case that the
struggle is worthwhile. Meanwhile, the drug Mafia has struck back
with more than 200 bombings and singled out and killed at least 13
officials. By the standards of civil war, the DAS headquarters
would qualify as a military target and therefore part of the price
paid by a country in conflict. But by blasting out of the sky a
civilian airplane filled with innocent passengers, the narcos
served notice that no one is safe from their vengeance.
Though the escalating violence is intimidating the population
and eroding Barco's support throughout the country, Colombian
officials contend that the season of terror is proof that their
battle is taking its toll against the intended targets. "We're
winning," insists General Miguel Maza Marquez, who as head of the
DAS directs the government's offensive (he escaped injury in last
week's bombing). "The chieftains no longer live comfortably. They
are in the mountains. The best proof that they are cracking is the
level of madness to which they have sunk."
The Bush Administration professes to be pleased with Bogota's
resolve, though officials are studying whether it will be safe
enough for the President to attend a drug summit in Colombia early
next year. "Barco is an engineer, and so he took a while to make
up his mind," says a U.S. official. "But now that he's taken a
decision to fight these guys, he's unshakable." But if Barco's
campaign is lauded by the politicians in Washington, it has more
than its share of deserters among the politicians in Colombia.
Aware that the specter of an American jail cell remains the drug
bosses' darkest nightmare, the Colombian Supreme Court last October
upheld Barco's use of executive powers to extradite suspects wanted
in the U.S. But last week the Colombian House of Representatives
voted to put the question of extradition on a nationwide referendum
early next year. In so doing, the legislators effectively washed
their hands of the issue and admitted to their constituents that
they do not have the gumption to make tough decisions for the
country's overall good if it means endangering their own lives.
Increasingly, Colombian public opinion favors negotiating with
the narcos. It is a notion that Barco's associates know better than
to utter around the office. When police foiled a plot to kill
Barco's daughter, the flinty President said, "With common criminals
and gutless assassins, dialogue is not possible."
The drug lords seem to be getting the message. An authorized
spokesman for one of the cartels told TIME that Escobar, Gacha and
Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, don of the Cali cartel, recognize
Barco's inflexibility and are waiting for his term to expire next
August. Says the source: "They'll try to reason with the next
President." But "reason" is surely a euphemism for "control."
Through intermediaries, the narcos are putting money behind
candidates for President, Congress and mayors of key cities. After
election day, the bill will come due.
Having endured Barco's best shot so far, the drug chieftains
appear to be rebuilding their scorched empire. Cocaine production,
which in September dropped to a quarter of its usual level of about
50 tons, is back up to 75%. Says a Western diplomat: "They were
knocked off balance, but never out of business. If they need to
boost production, they offer people double or triple salary. Money
means nothing to them."
The government distinguishes among its enemies, and holds Gacha
and Escobar responsible for most of Colombia's recent violence. By
contrast, Bogota considers the Rodriguez Orejuela mob from Cali to
be white-collar criminals, who would rather make money than
headlines. While less prone to violence, the Cali organization does
its share to keep the drug pipeline full. The two biggest recent
busts in the U.S. -- 22 tons of cocaine in Los Angeles concealed
in an unguarded warehouse and six tons in New York City hidden
inside barrels of caustic powder -- both originated in Cali.
Barco's war, however, is not primarily intended to keep the
rest of the world safe from Colombian drugs. He views the narcos
first as a threat to his country, and thus devotes fewer resources
to destroying the Cali clan than the other cartels. Says General
Maza: "In 1984 we didn't have a clear idea of the dimension of the
problem. We didn't realize that they had our society practically
under their control. They are killing Colombia. We have to resolve
this problem first. Then we can take part in the world fight."
Gacha has responded to the spotlight in typically ugly fashion.
His organization plans to introduce American drug users to basuco,
a partly processed coca plant that is later mixed with ether to
purify it into cocaine. Basuco, which is just as addictive as
crack, has long been used by poor Colombians, who mix it with
tobacco and smoke it. Says a cartel source: "Gacha thinks basuco
will be very popular among poor Americans. He blames America for
the injury his business has suffered and wants to punish the U.S."
There are signs that the cartel's monopoly on the coke trade
is waning. Recent bombings in Bogota may be the work of free-lance
criminals seeking to muscle in on the families' business.
Authorities believe new organizations are being set up in Peru,
Bolivia, Mexico and the U.S.
Meanwhile, Colombia's government and its most wanted criminals
feint and jab at one another. For Barco, the capture of Escobar or
Gacha would justify his unyielding crusade. For the drug thugs, the
assassination or abduction of a top government official would
convince the public that a deal is needed. Moans Interior Minister
Carlos Lemos Simmonds: "I go from an armored car to a guarded
office. My feet have not touched the streets for weeks. My family
lives in terror." An understandable lament, but Lemos and his
family -- as well as the rest of the country -- will continue to
live in terror as long as the U.S. demand for cocaine remains keen
and Colombia's drug masters insist on being the main suppliers.
